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Abstract
In a collectivised pension fund, investors agree that any money re-
maining in the fund when they die can be shared among the survivors.
We compute analytically the optimal investment-consumption strat-
egy for a fund of n identical investors with homogeneous Epstein–Zin
preferences, investing in the Black–Scholes market in continuous time but
consuming in discrete time. Our result holds for arbitrary mortality dis-
tributions.
We also compute the optimal strategy for an infinite fund of investors,
and prove the convergence of the optimal strategy as n→∞. The proof
of convergence shows that effective strategies for inhomogeneous funds
can be obtained using the optimal strategies found in this paper for ho-
mogeneous funds, using the results of [2].
We find that a constant consumption strategy is suboptimal even for
infinite collectives investing in markets where assets provide no return so
long as investors are “satisfaction risk-averse.” This suggests that annu-
ities and defined benefit investments will always be suboptimal invest-
ments.
We present numerical results examining the importance of the fund
size, n, and the market parameters.
Introduction
A group of individuals may group together and invest income for their retirement
in a collective fund. When an individual dies, any funds associated with that
individual are then divided among the survivors. The paper [2] shows how to
model the management of these funds mathematically and argues that they
should yield significantly better results for investors than traditional pension
investment models.
This paper complements [2] by computing the optimal investment strategy
for collective investment under the following assumptions:
(i) There are n identical investors in the collective.
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(ii) The fund may invest in continuous time in a Black–Scholes–Merton market
with one risky asset.
(iii) The mortality of the individuals is independent: that is there is no system-
atic longevity risk. Mortality occurs with a known probability distribution.
(iv) The preferences of each individual are given by homogeneous Epstein–Zin
preferences with mortality (as defined in [2]).
(v) Consumption occurs in discrete time (for example once per year).
We formulate the problem mathematically and are able to give analytical for-
mulae for the optimal consumption and investment at each time.
Assumption (i), that the investors are identical, is not a significant restric-
tion. The paper [2] shows that once one knows how to manage a fund of identical
individuals, it is easy to devise very effective management strategies for inho-
mogeneous funds, i.e. funds of diverse individuals.
Assumption (ii), that the market is a Black–Scholes–Merton market is, of
course, restrictive. This is the simplest type of market we could consider. We are
trading full realism for analytic tractability. The assumption that the market
has only one risky asset is not restrictive. It follows from the mutual fund
theorem arguments of [1] that essentially the same strategy can be used in a
Black–Scholes–Merton market with n stocks.
Assumption (iv), that the preferences are given by homogeneous Epstein–
Zin utility, is a central assumption to this paper, and is key to the analytic
tractability of the problem. We consider different possible models for prefer-
ences over consumption with mortality in [2] and find that two models stand
out as having particularly attractive properties. These models are called homo-
geneous Epstein–Zin preferences and exponential Kihlstrom–Mirman preferences
in [2] and we will use the same terminology. As the results of this paper demon-
strate, homogeneous Epstein–Zin preferences have the tremendous advantage
of being analytically tractable. This stems from the homogeneity property of
these preferences. By contrast, we can only expect to solve analogous problems
with exponential Kihlstrom–Mirman preferences using numerical methods (we
show how to do this in [3]). It is possible to define inhomogeneous Epstein–Zin
preferences with mortality (see [2]). We believe that the techniques of [3] could
be applied to such problems, but that one cannot, in general, expect analytical
results without homogeneity.
Assumption (v), that consumption occurs in discrete time is not a significant
restriction. Indeed one might argue it adds to the realism of the model.
The apparent mismatch between discrete time consumption and continuous
time investment is the key technical trick required to obtain our analytic re-
sults. As is explained in [1], the Black–Scholes–Merton market is isomorphic
to a linear market in continuous time and this explains the analytic tractabil-
ity of many problems involving this market. However, in discrete time the
Black–Scholes–Merton market is fundamentally non-linear, and this explains
the analytic intractability of problems such as Merton’s investment problem in
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discrete time. We deduce that we must allow continuous time investment to
obtain analytic results.
On the other hand, if we are to allow arbitrary mortality distributions and
continuous time consumption, then there is no hope of obtaining analytic re-
sults as one wouldn’t even be able to write down the mortality distribution in
general. Our assumption of discrete time consumption is essentially equivalent
to assuming that mortality occurs in discrete time, and so restricts the set of
mortality distributions we are considering to ensure tractability.
The advantage of analytic tractability is the insight it gives us into optimal
pension investment.
For example, we can analyse how consumption varies over time. We find
that except for very special cases, constant consumption is never optimal. This
is interesting because many people see a defined-benefit pension which provides
constant real-terms income as the “gold standard” for a pension fund. Our
result shows that chasing constant income is, in fact, suboptimal.
It perhaps isn’t so surprising that if market returns are non-zero there are
advantages to taking some risk by investing in equities.
Nor should it be surprising that delaying consumption to benefit from market
returns can also be advantageous. We are able to make this precise by computing
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in our model.
It is perhaps, surprising that even if one assumes that both equities and
bonds provide no return, it is still not optimal to receive a constant income, if one
is satisfaction risk-averse (see below for a definition). Under these circumstances
it can be optimal to spend earlier (if the primary risk one perceives is the risk of
dying before one can consume one’s pension) or to spend later (if the primary
risk one perceives is the risk of living for a long time on an inadequate pension).
Let us now describe the structure of the paper.
Section 1 reviews the definition of homogeneous Epstein–Zin preferences with
mortality.
Section 2 states the optimal investment problems we will solve. The problem
depends upon the number of individuals n. We will also state an investment
problem for a fund which is intended to represent the limiting case n =∞.
Section 3 solves the optimal investment problems analytically in the cases
where n = 1 and n =∞.
Section 4 computes how consumption and wealth vary over time, giving
analytic descriptions of their probability distributions.
Section 5 generalizes the results to arbitrary fund sizes n.
Section 6 uses our results to provide a rigorous justification for the claim
that our models for finite n converge to the case n = ∞. This is of obvious
theoretical interest in its own right, but we remark that the proof is essential to
demonstrating that the strategies for inhomogeneous funds of described in [2]
will be effective.
3
1 Homogeneous Epstein–Zin utility with mor-
tality
Let us recall the definition of homogeneous Epstein–Zin utility with mortality
given in [2]. In order to give a crisp definition, we first define a convention for
how we will we handle algebra using infinite and infinitesimal values.
Definition 1.1. The extended positive reals R++ is the set
R++ = R+ ∪ {α | α ∈ R \ {0}}
where  is a symbol representing an infinitesimal value. We extend addition,
multiplication and raising to a real power to R++ in the obvious way:
x+ α =
{
x when α > 0
α otherwise
α + β = min{α,β}
xα = α
αβ = α+β
(α)β = αβ
We now assume that we are given a time grid T = {t0, t0 + δt, t0 + 2 δt, t0 +
3 δt . . . , T − δt} where t0 is some initial time, δt is a fixed time step and T is
the time by which we assume mortality is certain.
We will model the individual’s consumption as a non-negative stochastic pro-
cess (γt)t∈T in a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,Ft,P). The time of death τ is
a stopping time taking values in T . Our convention is that any consumption up
to and including time τ may effect the individual’s utility, but any consumption
occurring after time τ will be ignored.
Definition 1.2. Homogeneous Epstein–Zin utility with mortality is defined for a
non-negative consumption process (γt)t∈T and a stopping time τ taking values
in T . It depends on parameters α ∈ (−∞, 1) \ {0}, ρ ∈ (−∞, 1) \ {0}, and
0 < β = e−bt ≤ 1. It is the R++-valued random process defined recursively by
Zt(γ, τ) =
{

1
α t > τ ;[
γρt + β Et(Zt+δt(γ, τ)α)
ρ
α
] 1
ρ otherwise.
(1.1)
2 The optimal investment problem
A general optimal investment problem for a homogeneous collective fund was
described mathematically in [2]. In this section we summarize the formulation
of [2], specializing to the case of interest for this paper.
We model a collective fund of n investors. The fund may invest in either a
riskless bond which grows at a risk-free rate of r or in a stock whose price at
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time t, is denoted St. The stock price at time t0 is given. At subsequent times
St obeys the SDE
dSt = St(µdt+ σ dWt) St0 (2.1)
for a constant drift µ and volatility σ, and a 1-dimensional Brownian motion
Wt.
We will model consumption taking place in discrete time on a grid T as de-
scribed in the previous section. Since we are modelling consumption in discrete
time, we may safely model mortality in discrete time. We let τ be a random vari-
able modelling the time of death of a representative individual. We assume that
τ has a probability distribution given by ptdT (t) where dT (t) is the measure
given by adding the Dirac measures associated to the grid points of T .
Let st denote the survival probability between times t and t+ δt. That is
st =
∑∞
i=1 pt+iδt∑∞
i=0 pt+iδt
(2.2)
Write nt for the number of individuals individuals with a time of death greater
than or equal to t. The process (nt)t∈T is a Markov process, with initial value
nt0 . Note, however, that nt+δt will be Ft measurable. We choose this convention
for nt as it works well with our existing convention that individuals who die at
age t still consume at time t.
For the case of a finite number of individuals, the transition probability of
nt moving from a value of n at time t to the value i at time t+ δt is given by
St(n, i) :=
(
n
i
)
(st)
i(1− st)n−i. (2.3)
We also wish to write down a formal optimal investment problem for the
case of a fund with n =∞ investors. In this case we will define nt =∞ for all
times up to T .
We will write at for proportion of the fund invested in stock at time t. We
will write Xt for the value of the fund per survivor at time t before consumption.
We will define Xt = 0 if nt = 0. Similarly, we will write Xt for the value of the
fund per survivor after consumption. We note that Xt = limh↗tXh at time
points t ∈ T . At intermediate times, t ∈ [iδt, (i+ 1)δt), Xt obeys the SDE
dXt = Xt(atµ+ (1− at)r) dt+Xtatσ dWt,
with initial condition given by the budget equation
Xt =
{
nt
nt+δt
(Xt − γt) n finite
s−1t (Xt − γt) n =∞
(2.4)
unless nt+δt = 0 in which case we define Xt to be zero on [t, t+ δt). Note that
this formula is based on our convention that an individual who dies at a time
t still consumes at that time and the corresponding convention for nt which
ensures nt+δt is Ft measurable.
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Let τ i denote the time of death of individual i.
For finite n we let (Ω,F ,Ft,P) be the filtered probability space generated
by Wt and the time of death variables τ
i. We define τ = τ1 to be the time of
death variable for one specific individual whose time of death is greater than or
equal to t0.
For n = ∞ we let τ be any random variable with the distribution ptdT (t).
We let (Ω,F ,Ft,P) be the filtered probability space generated by Wt and τ .
Let A˜(x, t0) denote the space of admissible controls (γt, at): that is Ft-
predictable processes such that 0 ≤ γt ≤ Xt and with Xt0 = x. We define the
value function of our problem starting at time t0 to be
vn(x, t0) = sup
(γ,a)∈A˜(x,t0)
Zt0(γ, τ
1). (2.5)
where Zt0 is an Epstein–Zin utility function.
3 The cases n = 1 and n =∞
To highlight the key ideas we will consider only the case when n = 1 and n =∞
in this section, leaving the case of general n until Section 5. We define C to
distinguish these cases as follows
C =
{
0 n = 1
1 n =∞. (3.1)
We write zt := vn(1, t) so that the positive-homogeneity of Zt implies that
vn(x, t) = x zt. (3.2)
We note that we have not yet shown whether z is finite, but equation (3.2) can
still be interpreted for infinite values of z.
Let ct denote the consumption rate at time t, so γt = ctXt for an individual
who is still alive at time t. The budget equation (2.4) can then be written as
Xt = s
−C
t (1− ct)Xt. (3.3)
We now let At+δt(x, ct) be the set of random variables Xt+δt representing
the value of our investments at time t+δt that can be obtained by a continuous
time trading strategy with an initial budget given by (3.3) with Xt = x. Thus
At+δt(x, ct) is the set of admissible investment returns given the budget and the
consumption.
The Markovianity of Epstein–Zin preferences and the definition of Zt to
compute allow us to apply the dynamic programming principle to compute
vn(x, t) = sup
ct≥0,Xt+δt∈At+δt(x,ct)
[(x ct)
ρ + β{stEt(vn(Xt+δt, t+ δt)α)}
ρ
α ]
1
ρ
= sup
ct≥0,Xt+δt∈At+δt(x,ct)
[(x ct)
ρ + βzρt+δt{stEt(Xαt+δt)}
ρ
α ]
1
ρ . (3.4)
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The second line follows from the first by the positive homogeneity of Epstein–Zin
utility (3.2).
If α > 0, we may compute the value of
sup
Xt∈At+δt(ct)
Et(Xαt+δt)
by solving the Merton problem for optimal investment over time period [t, t+δt],
with initial budget Xt, no consumption, and terminal utility function u(x) = x
α.
We find
sup
Xt∈At+δt(ct)
Et(Xαt+δt) = (exp(ξ δt)Xt)α (3.5)
where
ξ = sup
a∈R
[a(µ− r) + r − 1
2
a2(1− α)σ2]
= a∗(µ− r) + r − 1
2
(a∗)2(1− α)σ2, with a∗ := µ− r
(1− α)σ2 (3.6)
For details see Merton’s paper [6] or [9] equations (3.47) and (3.48). Moreover
the proportion invested in stock is given by a∗ which is a constant determined
entirely by α and the market. In the case where α < 0 we must instead compute
inf
Xt∈At+δt(ct)
Et(Xαt+δt).
However, apart from the change of a sup to an inf everything is algebraically
identical, so the same formulae emerge.
Putting the value (3.5) into our expression (3.4) for the value function we
obtain
vn(x, t) = sup
ct≥0
[(x ct)
ρ + zρt+δtβ (st exp(αξ δt)X
α
t )
ρ
α ]
1
ρ
= sup
ct≥0
[(x ct)
ρ + β (zt+δt exp(ξ δt)s
( 1α−C)
t (1− ct)Xt)ρ]
1
ρ (3.7)
where the last line follows from the budget equation (3.3). We define
φt := β
1
ρ exp(ξδt)s
( 1α−C)
t θt := φtzt+δt (3.8)
so that (3.7) may be written as
zt = sup
ct≥0
[(ct)
ρ + θρt (1− ct)ρ]
1
ρ (3.9)
Differentiating the expression in square brackets on the right-hand side, we
see that the supremum is achieved in equation (3.7) when ct = c
∗
t , where c
∗
t
satisfies
ρ (c∗t )
ρ−1 − ρθρt ((1− c∗t )ρ−1 = 0,
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or, if this yields a negative value for c∗t , we should take c
∗
t = 0. Simplifying we
must have (
c∗t
1− c∗t
)ρ−1
= θρt . (3.10)
So
c∗t = (1 + θ
ρ
1−ρ
t )
−1. (3.11)
This expression for c∗t is non-negative, so it always gives the argument for the
supremum in (3.7). We obtain
zt = [(c
∗
t )
ρ + θρt (1− c∗t )ρ]
1
ρ
= c∗t
[
1 + θρt
(
1− c∗t
c∗t
)ρ] 1ρ
= c∗t
[
1 + θρt
(
θ
ρ
ρ−1
t
)−ρ] 1ρ
, by (3.10),
= c∗t
[
1 + (θ
1− ρρ−1
t )
ρ
] 1
ρ
= c∗t
[
1 + θ
ρ
1−ρ
t
] 1
ρ
= (1 + θ
ρ
ρ−1
t )
−1(1 + θ
ρ
1−ρ
t )
1
ρ , by (3.11),
= (1 + θ
ρ
1−ρ
t )
1−ρ
ρ .
We conclude that
z
ρ
1−ρ
t = 1 + θ
ρ
1−ρ
t = 1 + φ
ρ
1−ρ
t z
ρ
1−ρ
t+δt (3.12)
where φ is given by equation (3.8). We observe also that equation (3.11) for the
optimal consumption rate per survivor simplifies to
c∗t = z
ρ
ρ−1
t . (3.13)
We summarize our findings below.
Theorem 3.1 (Optimal investment with Epstein–Zin preferences). Suppose
that an individual has probability ptδt of dying in the interval [t, t + δt]. Indi-
viduals consume at fixed time points i δt. By the time Nδt, death is certain.
Between time points, we may trade in the Black–Scholes–Merton market (2.1).
Let C = 0 if we are interested in optimizing the consumption of an individual
and C = 1 if we are interested in the collectivised problem. The utility of each
individual is given by Epstein–Zin utility of the form (1.1). Then
(i) The optimal proportion of stock investments is determined entirely by the
monetary-risk-aversion α and the market. In particular it is independent
of time and wealth. It is given by the value a∗ given in equation (3.6).
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(ii) The optimal Epstein–Zin utility is given by xzt where zt obeys the differ-
ence equation (3.12). The value of φt is given in equation (3.8). The
optimal Epstein–Zin utility may be computed recursively since zNδt = 0
1
α .
(iii) The consumption for each survivor at time t is given by γt = xtc
∗
t where
c∗t is given by (3.13).
4 Consumption over time
It is interesting to see how wealth and the consumption per individual vary over
time.
Theorem 4.1. Under the same conditions as 3.1, the optimal fund value per
survivor at time t, Xt, follows a log normal distribution. Write µ
X
t and σ
X
t for
the mean and standard deviation of logXt so that
logXt ∼ N(µXt , (σXt )2). (4.1)
The standard deviation is given by
σXt = σa
∗√t. (4.2)
where a∗ is given by (3.6). The mean satisfies the difference equation
µXt+δt = µ
X
t + log(s
−C
t ) + log
(
1− z
ρ
ρ−1
t
)
+ ξ˜δt, µX0 = log(x0) (4.3)
where zt is given by (3.12) and where we define ξ˜ by the same formula used to
define ξ but with α set to zero, i.e.
ξ˜ := a∗(µ− r) + r − 1
2
(a∗)2σ2. (4.4)
The optimal consumption per survivor γt at time t is also log normally dis-
tributed with
log γt ∼ N( ρρ−1 log(zt) + µXt , (σXt )2). (4.5)
The mean of the log consumption per survivor satisfies the equation
E(log γt+δt | γt) = log(γt) + log(s−Ct ) +
ρ
1− ρ log(φt) + ξ˜δt (4.6)
where φt is given by equation (3.8).
Proof. We suppose as induction hypothesis that the distribution of Xt is as
described at time t.
The budget equation (3.3) then tells us that the wealth per survivor after
consumption, Xt, satisfies
Xt = s
−C
t (1− z
ρ
ρ−1
t )Xt.
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Hence
logXt ∼ N(µXt + log(s−Ct (1− z
ρ
ρ−1
t )), (σ
X
t )
2).
Our investment strategy from t to (t+ δt) is a continuous time trading strategy
where we hold a fixed proportion of our wealth in stocks at all time. So, in the
interval (t, t+ δt], Xt satisfies the SDE
dXt = (1− a∗)rXt dt+ a∗Xt(µdt+ σ dWt), Xt = Xt.
By Itoˆ’s lemma we find
d(logX)t = (1− a∗)r dt+ a∗((µ− 12a∗σ2) dt+ σ dWt), logXt = logXt
= ξ˜dt+ a∗σ dWt. (4.7)
We deduce that (logXt+δt− logXt) conditioned on the value of Xt will follow a
normal distribution with mean ξ˜ δt and standard deviation a∗σ
√
δt. Moreover
the random variable (logXt+δt − logXt) is independent of Xt.
The sum of independent normally distributed random increments yields a
new normally distributed random variable, and one can compute the mean and
variance by adding the mean and variance of the increments. Hence
logXt+δt ∼ N(µXt+δt, (σXt+δt)2)
where
µXt+δt = µ
X
t + log(s
−C
t (1− z
ρ
ρ−1
t )) + ξ˜ δt (4.8)
and
(σXt+δt)
2 = (σXt )
2 + (a∗)2σ2δt. (4.9)
Solving the recursion (4.9) yields equation (4.2). The result for Xt now follows
by induction.
Equation (4.5) follows from equation (3.13). Using (4.5), (4.3) we calculate
E(logγt+δt | γt)− log(γt)
=
ρ
ρ− 1 (log(zt+δt)− log(zt)) + log(s
−C
t ) + log(1− z
ρ
ρ−1
t ) + ξ˜δt
=
ρ
1− ρ (log(zt)− log(zt+δt)) + log(s
−C
t ) + log
(
z
ρ
1−ρ
t − 1
z
ρ
1−ρ
t
)
+ ξ˜δt
= log(s−Ct ) + log
(
φ
ρ
1−ρ
t
)
+ ξ˜δt by equation (3.12).
This completes the proof.
To interpret Theorem 4.1 we specialize to the case of a market where µ =
r = 0 and to preferences with β = 1. This represents the problem of consuming
a fixed lump sum over time when there is no inflation but also no investment
opportunities. While not financially reasonable, this problem highlights how
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longevity risk affects consumption, when considered in isolation from market
risk.
In this case γt is a deterministic function. We find from equations (4.6) and
(3.8) that
γt+δt =
(
s
1
α−Cρ
t
) ρ
1−ρ
γt. (4.10)
We note that st is a non-zero probability, so 0 < st ≤ 1. We may use equation
(4.10) to compute whether γ increases or decreasing over time. We summarize
the results in Table 4.
Perhaps surprisingly, we find that sometimes consumption increases over
time rather than decreases. In the collectivised case, this can be explained by
the fact that the pension will always be inadequate when α < 0. We say that
a pension is inadequate if living an extra year on that pension decreases utility.
If α < 0, living longer is considered negative by homogeneous Epstein–Zin
preferences, so we may wish to compensate individuals who have the misfortune
to live longer. We cannot identify these individuals in advance, so the only way
to provide this compensation is to increase consumption over time. Thus the
increasing consumption arises from the fact that when α < 0, the primary risk is
the inadequacy of the pension, when α > 0, the primary risk is dying young. We
believe that this mixing of the notion of pension adequacy with the risk aversion
parameter is a significant shortcoming of homogeneous Epstein–Zin preferences.
It is the price one must pay for analytic tractability.
In the individual case, the concern that one will die young is much more
serious. This is why for the individual problem, the fear of an inadequate
pension only dominates when both α < 0 and 0 < ρ < 1.
The case when α = ρ corresponds to the case of standard von-Neumann
Morgernstern preferences, in which case constant consumption is optimal in the
collectivised case as was proved in [2].
More significantly, our result also shows the converse. Constant consumption
from one period to the next is only optimal if and only if either (i) the survival
probability is one, or (ii) α = ρ so one is satisfaction risk-neutral. Hence, even
ignoring market effects constant consumption will be suboptimal for any realistic
parameter choices.
We have not shown the case α > ρ in Table 4 as in this case one has
monetary-risk-aversion but not satisfaction-risk-aversion. We found the result-
ing behaviour to be difficult to interpret as rational, cautious (as understood
intuitively) strategies. We see this simply as a evidence that satisfaction-risk-
aversion is the correct operationalization of the intuitive notion of risk-aversion.
It is also interesting to calculate how consumption changes according to the
available investment opportunities. If interest rates increase one may choose
to defer consumption to a later date to benefit from the increased rate. To
quantify this behaviour one wishes to calculate the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution which is defined as follows.
Definition 4.2. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution at time t is defined
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Collectivised Individual
α < ρ < 0 < 1 Increasing Decreasing
α < 0 < ρ < 1 Increasing Increasing
0 < α < ρ < 1 Decreasing Decreasing
α = ρ < 0 < 1 Constant Decreasing
0 < α = ρ < 1 Constant Decreasing
Table 1: The behaviour of consumption with time when µ = r = 0, β = 1 and
α ≤ ρ.
to be
EISt :=
1
δt
d
dr
(E(log(γt+1))− log(γt)) .
When γt is deterministic, this definition corresponds with the standard definition
[5].
Theorem 4.1 allows us to calculate this elasticity.
Corollary 4.3. For the optimal investment strategy of Theorem (3.1) we have
EISt =
1
1− ρ
(
1− (µ− r)(1 + α(ρ− 2))
(α− 1)2σ2
)
.
If µ = r this simplifies to
EISt =
1
1− ρ .
In the case of von Neumann-Morgernstern utility we have
EISt =
1
1− ρ
(
1− µ− r
σ2
)
.
Proof. From (4.6) and (3.8) we immediately find
EISt =
d
dr
(
ρ
1− ρξ − ξ˜
)
.
The result is now a simple calculation from (3.6) and (4.4).
5 General finite collectives
Let vn be the value function (2.5) for the optimal investment problem for n in-
dividuals with homogeneous Epstein–Zin preferences. By positive homogeneity
we may define zn,t := vn(1, t), so that vn(x, t) = xzn,t.
Let Ii,t0+δt denote the event that both
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(i) there are i survivors at time t0 + δt, i.e. nt+δt = i.
(ii) the individual whose utility we wish to calculate is one of those survivors,
so τ ι > t.
Recall that Xt denotes the value of the fund per survivor at time t before
consumption and mortality.
Et0(Zαt0+δt | Ii,t0+δt) = Et0(vi(Xt0+δt, t0 + δt)α | Ii,t0+δt).
Hence
Et0(Zαt0+δt) =
nt∑
i=1
i
nt
St(nt, i)Et0(vi(Xt0+δt, t0 + δt)α | Ii,t0+δt).
We now let At+δt(x, ct) be the set of random variables Xt+δt representing
the value of the fund per survivor at time t + δt before consumption that
can be obtained by a continuous time trading strategy given initial capital
Xt =
nt+δt
nt
(1 − ct)Xt per survivor when Xt = x. Writing ct for the rate of
consumption and using the dynamic programming principle we find
vn(x, t) = sup
ct≥0
Xt+δt∈At+δt(x,ct)
(x ct)ρ + β{ n∑
i=1
i
n
St(n, i)Et(vi(Xt+δt, t+ δt)α | Ii,t0+δt)
} ρ
α
 1ρ
= sup
ct≥0
Xt+δt∈At+δt(x,ct)
(x ct)ρ + β{( n∑
i=1
i
n
St(n, i)z
α
i,t+δtEt(Xαt+δt | Ii,t0+δt)
)} ρ
α
 1ρ .
(5.1)
We used positive homogeneity to obtain the last line. The argument of Section
3 tells us how to optimize over Xt. Hence we find
zn,t = sup
ct≥0
(ct)ρ + β( n∑
i=1
(
i
n
)1−α
St(n, i)z
α
i,t+δt
) ρ
α
(exp(ξ δt)(1− ct))ρ
 1ρ
where ξ is as defined in equation (3.6). The optimal investment policy is also
described in equation (3.6), and as before it depends only on the market and
the monetary-risk-aversion parameter α.
We may rewrite our expression for zn,t as follows:
zn,t = sup
ct≥0
[
(ct)
ρ + θ˜ρn,t(1− ct)ρ
] 1
ρ
(5.2)
where
θ˜n,t = β
1
ρ exp(ξ δt)
(
n∑
i=1
(
i
n
)1−α
St(n, i)z
α
i,t+δt
) 1
α
. (5.3)
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Equation (5.2) is structurally identical to equation (3.9). Hence from equation
(3.12) we may deduce similarly that
z
ρ
1−ρ
n,t = 1 + θ˜
ρ
1−ρ
n,t . (5.4)
We state our results as a theorem.
Theorem 5.1. Let zn,t denote the optimal Epstein–Zin utility, (2.5), for a
collective of n individuals investing an amount 1 at time t. The collective is
allowed to invest in the Black–Scholes–Merton market (2.1) in continuous time.
Individuals have independent mortality, with survival probability given by (2.2).
Then equations (5.4) and (5.3) together with the initial condition zn,T = 0
1
α
allow us to compute the optimal Epstein–Zin utility by recursion. The value of
ξ is given in equation (3.6) and the value of S(n, i) is given in equation (2.3)
It is reassuring to check that θ˜1,t in equation (5.3) coincides with the value
of θt for the individual problem given by equation (3.8).
6 Convergence of vn as n→∞
In this section we will analyse the behaviour as n→∞ to prove the following.
Theorem 6.1. Let z∞,t denote the maximum Epstein–Zin utility at time t for
the infinitely collectivized case then
zn,t = z∞,t +O(n−
1
2 ).
Our proof strategy will be to approximate an expectation involving the bi-
nomial distribution with a Gaussian integral which we can then estimate using
Laplace’s method. To get a precise convergence result, we need some estimates
on the rate of convergence in the Central Limit Theorem. The estimates given
in [4] suit our purposes well. For the reader’s convenience we will summarize
the result we will need.
We begin with some definitions. A random variable X is said to satisfy
Crame´r’s condition if its characteristic function fX satisfies
sup{|fX(t)| | t > η} < 1 (6.1)
for all positive η. Let Φ be the standard normal distribution. Given a set A ⊆ R,
and a function g, ωg(A) is defined to equal
ωg(A) := sup{|g(x)− g(y)| | x, y ∈ A}.
The set B(x) is the ball of radius  around x.
Let Qn be the appropriately normalized n-th partial sum of a sequence of
independent identically distributed random variables X(i) for which Crame´r’s
condition holds and which have finite moments have all orders. Appropriately
normalized means normalized such that the central limit theorem implies Qn
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converges to Φ in distribution. Then there exists a constant c such that for any
bounded measurable function g
|
∫
R
g d(Qn − Φ)| ≤ c ωg(R)n− 12 +
∫
ωg(B
cn−
1
2
(x))dΦ(x). (6.2)
The full result given in [4] is more general and more precise than we need. Let
us explain how the statements are related. We have simplified our statement to
the one-dimensional case, we have assumed the X(i) are identically distributed
and we have assumed all moments of X(1) exist. The statement in [4] is therefore
more complex, and in particular involves additional terms called ρs,n defined in
the one-dimensional case by
ρs,n :=
1
n
(
n∑
i=1
E|σnX(i)|s)
where
σ2n := n
(
n∑
i=1
Var(X(i))
)−1
.
Our assumptions on X guarantee that ρs,n is independent of n and so we have
been able to absorb these terms into the constant c. In addition, our statement
uses Theorem 1 of [4], together with remarks at the end of the second paragraph
on page 242 about Crame´r’s condition.
We are now ready to prove the desired convergence result.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. We proceed by a backward induction on t. The result is
trivial for the case t = T . We now assume the induction hypothesis
zn,t+δt = z∞,t+δt +O(n−
1
2 ).
We wish to compute θ˜n,t, but only the sum in the expression (5.3) is difficult to
compute. We will call this sum λn,t, so
λn,t :=
n∑
i=1
(
i
n
)1−α
St(n, i)z
α
i,t+δt. (6.3)
Heuristically, one can approximate with a Gaussian integral using the Cen-
tral Limit Theorem and then apply Laplace’s method to compute the limit as
n → ∞. This motivates the idea of decomposing the sum above into a “left
tail” for small values of i, a central term for values of i near the mean of the
Binomial distribution np, and a “right tail” for larger values of i. We will in fact
bound the tails separately (Steps 1 and 2, below), and then we will be able to
rigorously apply a Central Limit Theorem argument to the central term (Step
3).
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We compute
St(n, i− 1)
St(n, i)
=
ist
(1− i+ n)(1− st) . (6.4)
We note that
i ≤ (n+ 1)(1− st)
(λ− 1)st + 1 =⇒
ist
(1− i+ n)(1− st) ≤
1
λ
=⇒ St(i− 1, n)
St(i, n)
≤ 1
λ
.
So we define an integer Nλ,t,n by
Nλ,t,n :=
⌊
(n+ 1)(1− st)
(λ− 1)st + 1
⌋
and then equation (6.4) will ensure that we have exponential decay of St(i, n)
as i decreases
i ≤ Nλ,t,n =⇒ S(n, i) ≤ λi−Nλ,t,nS(n,Nλ,t,n). (6.5)
Step 1. We can now estimate the left tail of (6.3). There exists a constants
C1,t, C2,t such that
N3,t,n∑
i=1
(
i
n
)1−α
St(n, i) ≤ C1,t
∫ N3,t,n
1
3−N3,t,n+iS(n,N3,t,n)
((
1
n
)1−α
+ 1
)
di
≤ C2,tS(n,N3,t,n)
((
1
n
)1−α
+ 1
)
. (6.6)
To estimate this term, we observe that
N2,t,n −N3,t,n =
⌊
(n+ 1)(1− st)
st + 1
⌋
−
⌊
(n+ 1)(1− st)
2st + 1
⌋
≥
⌊
(n+ 1)(1− st)
st + 1
− (n+ 1)(1− st)
2st + 1
⌋
− 2
=
⌊
(n+ 1)st(1− st)
(st + 1)(2st + 1)
⌋
− 2
Hence by equations (6.4) and (6.6) we find
N3,t,n∑
i=1
(
i
n
)1−α
St(n, i) ≤ C2,tS(N2,t,n, n)2−
⌊
(n+1)st(1−st)
(st+1)(2st+1)
⌋
+2
((
1
n
)1−α
+ 1
)
≤ C2,t2−
⌊
(n+1)st(1−st)
(st+1)(2st+1)
⌋
+2
((
1
n
)1−α
+ 1
)
.
which decays exponentially as n → ∞. Our induction hypothesis ensures that
the zαi,t+δt are bounded, so we may safely conclude that
λn,t :=
 n∑
i=N3,t,n
(
i
n
)1−α
St(n, i)z
α
i,t+δt
+O(n− 12 ) (6.7)
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Step 2. We apply the same strategy to the right tail. This time we compute
St(n, i+ 1)
St(n, i)
=
(1− st)(n− i)
(i+ 1)st
we define
Mλ,t,n =
⌈
λn(1− st)− st
λ(1− st) + st
⌉
to ensure that
i ≥Mλ,t,n =⇒ St(n, i+ 1)
St(n, i)
≤ 1
λ
.
Repeating the same argument as for the left tail tells us that
λn,t :=
 M3,t,n∑
i=N3,t,n
(
i
n
)1−α
St(n, i)z
α
i,t+δt
+O(n− 12 ) (6.8)
We note that
(
i
n
)1−α
is monotonic in i and that
N3,t,n
n and
N3,t,n
n tend to finite,
non-zero limits as n → ∞. We deduce that there exists a constant C3,t such
that
N3,t,n ≤ i ≤M3,t,n =⇒
∣∣∣∣∣
(
i
n
)1−α∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ C3,t. (6.9)
This implies that
M3,t,n∑
i=N3,t,n
(
i
n
)1−α
St(n, i) ≤ C3,t
M3,t,n∑
i=N3,t,n
St(n, i) ≤ C3,t
Using this together with our induction hypothesis, we may obtain from (6.8)
that
λn,t :=
 M3,t,n∑
i=N3,t,n
(
i
n
)1−α
St(n, i)z
α
∞,t+δt
+O(n− 12 ). (6.10)
Step 3. In order to apply the bound (6.2), we define a Bernoulli random
variable Xi,t which takes the value 1 if the i-th individual survives at time t
and 0 otherwise. Thus St(n, i) is the probability that
∑n
j=1Xj,n = i. We define
scaled random variables X˜j,t of mean 0 and standard deviation 1 by
X˜j,t =
Xj − st√
st(1− st)
,
and so the appropriately scaled partial sum Qn is given by
Qn =
1√
n
n∑
i=1
X˜n =
1√
n
n∑
j=1
Xj − st√
st(1− st)
=
(
∑n
i=1Xi)− nst√
nst(1− st)
.
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We now wish to rewrite (6.10) as an integral.
λn,t =
∫
1[N3,t,n,M3,t,n](i)
(
i
n
)1−α
zα∞,t+δtd(
n∑
j=1
Xj,t)(i) +O(n
− 12 ).
We make the substitution i = nst + x
√
nst(1− st) to find
λn,t =
∫ [
1[N3,t,n,M3,t,n](nst + x
√
nst(1− st))
×
(
nst + x
√
nst(1− st)
n
)1−α
zα∞,t+δt
]
dQn(x) +O(n
− 12 ). (6.11)
We may rewrite this as
λn,t =
∫
1[`n,t,un,t](x)
(
nst + x
√
nst(1− st)
n
)1−α
zα∞,t+δt dQn(x) +O(n
− 12 )
(6.12)
where
`n,t := (N3,t,n − ns)/
√
ns(1− s), un,t := (M3,t,n − ns)/
√
ns(1− s).
From our expressions for N3,t,n and M3,t,n one readily sees that `n,t tends to
−∞ at a rate proportional to O(−√n) as n → ∞. Likewise un,t tends to +∞
at a rate O(
√
n) as n → ∞. We will assume that n is large enough to ensure
that `n,t < 0 < un,t.
Let us define g by
g = 1[`n,t,un,t](x)
(
nst + x
√
nst(1− st)
n
)1−α
. (6.13)
By (6.9), g is bounded by a constant independent of n. Hence ωg(R) is bounded
independent of n. We can bound the derivative of g inside the interval (`n,t, un,t),
independent of n. Hence for any x ∈ ( 12`n,t, 12un,t) and for sufficiently large n,
ωg(B
cn−
1
2
(x)) < C4,tn
− 12 for some constant C4,t independent of n. It follows
that ∫
1[ 12 `n,t,
1
2un,t]
(x)ωg(B
cn−
1
2
(x)) dΦ(x) = O(n−
1
2 ). (6.14)
Since `n,t tends to −∞ at a rate proportional to O(−
√
n), since g is bounded,
and since the normal distribution has super-exponential decay in the tails, we
have ∫
1(−∞,`n,t]ωg(Bcn− 12 (x)) dΦ(x) = O(n
− 12 ) (6.15)
and similarly ∫
1[un,t,∞)ωg(Bcn− 12 (x)) dΦ(x) = O(n
− 12 ). (6.16)
18
Estimates (6.14), (6.15), (6.16) together with the bound on ωg(R) allow us
to apply the Central Limit Theorem estimate (6.2) to (6.12). We note that
Crame´r’s condition holds. The result is
λn,t =
∫
1[`n,t,un,t](x)
(
nst + x
√
nst(1− st)
n
)1−α
zα∞,t+δt dΦ(x) +O(n
− 12 )
We now apply Laplace’s method to estimate this Gaussian integral (see
Proposition 2.1, page 323 in [10] ) and obtain
λn,t = s
1−α
t +O(n
− 12 )
From the definition of θ˜ in equation (5.3) and our definition of λn,t in (6.3) we
obtain
θ˜n,t = β
1
ρ exp(ξ δt)s
1−α
α
t z∞,t+δt +O(n
− 12 ).
We may now compare this with the definition of θt given in (3.8) for the infinitely
collectivised case C = 1. We see that in this case
θ˜n,t = θt +O(n
− 12 ).
It now follows from the recursion relations for zn,t and z∞,t (given in (3.12) and
(5.4) respectively) together with our induction hypothesis that
zn,t = z∞,t +O(n−
1
2 ).
This completes the induction step and the proof.
7 Numerical Results
We illustrate our results with some numerical examples. We will restrict our
attention to the case of von Neumann–Morgernstern preferences in this section.
We refer the reader to the numerical results of [2] where we give numerical results
for more general homogeneous Epstein–Zin preferences. In that paper we also
compare the results with those obtained using exponential Kihlstrom–Mirman
preferences.
For ease of comparison with [2] (and other pension models based on [8]) we
choose the parameter values given in Table 2. Due to the positive homogeneity
of our model, the choice of value for X0 is unimportant.
The mortality distribution we use is for women retiring at age 65 in 2019. We
obtained this distribution using the model “CMI 2018 F [1.5%]” as described
in [7].
We define the annuity equivalent value of each investment-consumption ap-
proach. We define this to be the price of an annuity which would give the same
gain. We define the annuity outperformance by
annuity outperformance :=
annuity equivalent
budget
− 1.
This gives a measure of the performance of the strategy relative to an annuity
of the same cost.
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Parameter Value
rCPI 0.02
r 0.047− rCPI
µ 0.082− rCPI
σ 0.15
ρ −1
Table 2: Summary of parameters used in this model
7.1 Dependence on the number of individuals, n
In Figure 1 we show how the annuity outperformance depends upon the number
of individuals n in the collective. This plot shows that as few as 40 individuals
are required to obtain most of the benefits of collectivisation. One does not
need a large fund to benefit from a collective investment: simply sharing risk
with one’s partner brings a substantial benefit.
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Figure 1: Dependence of annuity outperformance on the number of individuals
in the collective, n. Calculation performed with von Neumann–Morgernstern
preferences
7.2 Dependence on market parameters
To compare the relative impact of investment in the stock market, inter-temporal
substitution and collectivisation we have computed the annuity outperformance
for a number of different fund and market scenarios. The results are shown in
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Scenario µ r n Annuity outperformance
1 0.062 0.027 ∞ 59.1%
2 0.062 0.027 1 20.5%
3 0.027 0.027 ∞ 1.3%
4 0.000 0.000 ∞ 0%
Table 3: Annuity outperformance in a variety of scenarios
Table 3. Except where the table indicates a difference, the parameter values are
described in the previous section.
If scenarios A and B have an annuity outperformance of rA and rB then we
will say that scenario A gives an improvement of
1 + rA
1 + rB
− 1.
over scenario B.
So comparing Scenario 1 with Scenario 2 we see that the impact of collec-
tivisation in this example is an improvement of 32%. Comparing Scenarios 1
and 3, the impact of investing in stock, rather than just bonds, is even more
significant, yielding an almost 57% improvement. Comparing Scenarios 3 and
4, we see that exploiting inter-temporal substitution alone yields a relatively
modest 1.3% improvement.
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